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1. Introduction
The functions of auditing have been demonstrated in the different
perspectives from their backgrounds. In economics, auditing is treated as
an institution which makes people or organisation report truely and
prevents them reporting falsely( Antle,1982; Baron and Besanko,1984).
On the other hand, accounting separates auditing into two types, internal
auditing and external auditing. Internal auditors detect errors and
failures and make recommendations for improvement, while exter-nal
auditors certify the financial statements. Further, in politics and public
administrations, it is considered the last stage of the budget cycle to
evaluate the government activities and an information provider for
connecting the next stage to budgeting cycle.
Government auditing really implements the above all functions as
described in the INTOSAI's Standards. Audit activities that consist of
financial audits and performance audits, can be classified by functions
into the direct control function and the indirect control one, namely,
providing information. The former functions are to check and examine
This paper was presented at the EIASM Workshop on the Role of Accounting in Public
Sector Transition at Stockholm, in November 1996.
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the government activities, and recommend improvements in public
resource management. The latter are to certify the financial statements
of government agencies, and to evaluate the programmes or policies and
report to parliament. With respect to this comprehensiveness and
independence, previous studies have limitations. Also the approach based
on agency theory is not appropriate, because government auditor acts
independently and receives no directions from outside as in the case of
principal-agency relationship. The relation of SAl with parliament and
government needs to be rather considered client-clientee. Few authors!)
demonstrate why SAls make effort differently about the focused
functions, despite commonly orienting to performance auditing and
program evaluation.
Therefore, from the perspective of client-clientee relationships, we
show that the SAl's behaviour promoting the social welfare, which is
caused by the direct and the indirect functions, makes the differences in
functions among the SAls. Section 2 indicates the relation between
government auditing and public value. It demonstrates that public value
is ensured by some institutions including the SAl. Section 3 shows the
two effects produced from the two functions. A simple utility model is
presented in Section 4. The model analyses the burden sharing and the
focused efforts in the SAl in Sections 5 and 6 respectively. Lastly the
conclusions and the needs for future research are mentioned in Section 7.
2. Government auditing and public value
Government aims to increase social welfare by promoting public
value. As Hood(1991) indicated, public value consists of three elements:
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efficiency(o), equity(e), and trustJstability(;\,). Since public accountability
in government activities is a key post-measure to ensure the value21,
government auditing for improving the public accountability has an
important position in the whole ensuring system(see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Ensuring and Control System in Government
Ensuring and
Control System
< Internal
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Treasury
Internal Auditor
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Journalism
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External Auditor(SAI)
Corresponding to these elements, in fact, government auditing is now im-
plemented in terms of 3 Es(Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness),
compliance, and system security/stability respectively.
3. Effects of government auditing
SAl has two main clients within government system, government and
parliament. Therefore responses by SAl have two phases. The first is the
D-effect focusing on direct control such as detecting the failures and
recommendation for improvement in the management of public resources
against government agencies. The second is the I-effect focusing on the
information to assist Parliament in determining governmental
accountability, budgeting and accounting(see Figure 2). In other words,
the D-effect is a self-determined type that is produced through the SAl's
direct activity, while the I-effect is others-dependent and an in direct one
that is produced through using the report (information) by the SAl.
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SAl has to adjust both effects, because the needs of each client are not
always met by limitation in auditing resources. This dual client nature
impacts on SAl's behaviour, even though SAl is perfectly independent of
parliament and government.
Figure 2. D-elfecl(D) and l-effect(l)
External Environment
Internal Environment(within government)
IParli~mentcontrol~
reporting Government -+--+-- control
(I) t
L contrOl(D)tSAl
4. Utility of government auditing
Principal utilitues of government and parliament are, as shown in
Figure 2, caused by the D-effect and the I-effect respectively. However,
secondary utilities are caused in response to each client's need, I-effect to
government and D-effect to parliament. The utilities of the two clients
and the SAl are, therefore, determined by the SAl's effort level toward the
D-effect and I-effect. In addition, we consider the probability of SAl's
biased behaviour that the SAl would pay more regard to one client than
the other.
Now if we neglect the public as a client, the main clients' utilities by
government auditing Us and SAl's utility Ua are given by the following
functions:
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Us = fg[D, I] t fc[D, I] (1)
Ua = U(fg,fc) = U(fg) + qU(fc) - U(Ca) (2)
where D denotes the D-effect and I the I-effect; fg and fc mean the
utility function of government, parliament respectively; q indicates the
weighting parameter of parliament against the government's utility; Ca
shows the cost function of SAl. Thus an SAl makes a decison on its
activity by the two factors: burden sharing in ensuring the public value,
and effort vector to which client's need should be respected.
5. Comparison in terms of burden sharing
When we consider a SAl's institutional position in the government
system, nationality, and contents of the three elements of public value,
these elements on which the SAl burdens, are determined by the
following factors respectively:
(l)efficiency; the more dominant pre-control is over post-control or the
lower the consciousness ofthe taxpayers, the less an SAl burdens.
(2)equity; the larger the spectrum of judicial activities is the smaller an
SAl's burden becomes.
(3)trust/stability; the more an SAl focuses on system auditing or the
higher people's interest in risk is the more it burdens.
According to the above conditions, the states of SAls in the GECD's main
five countries are indicated as Figure 3.
We can see that the SAls in these countries are different in sharing
the three elements. That is, SAl in the USA has a small part of ensuring
equity because the Court plays an active role including the government
activities. The role of UK's SAl is, on the whole, similar to the USA's ow-
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ing to the same Anglo-Saxon. On the other hand, in France, equity
element is a major part since the SAl has a character of court for
government accounting. Also the German's SAl resembles Japan's in role
because of their independence. The difference in efficiency between the
two SAls is caused by the variation in public interest of public money.
Figure 3. Sharing of public value
Country Efficiency Equity Trust/Stable
USA H L M
UK H L-M L-M
Germany H M-H L
France L H M
Japan M M-H L
note; L,M,and H indicate the sharing ofSAl is low, medium, and high respectively
6. Comparison with which effect is respected
It is reasonable that an SAl also has a preference for increasing its
utility by providing more useful service to the clients. parliament and gov-
ernment are major clients. Hence, ifwe assume an SAl would increase its
utility given the institutional conditions, more respected client between
the two is decided upon the SAl's institutional position and the intensity
of need of each client.
As to the former factor, USA's SAl, General Accounting Office(GAO),
which is affiliated to the Congress would firstly respect the Congress, so
the GAO focuses on the I-effect that Congress prefers. Actually the
majority of GAO's works are implementation according to the requests
from Congress3). On the other hand, French SAl, Cour des comptes,whose
form is a court type, would control the government, therefore,
fundamentally focuses on the D-effect. German SAl, Bundesrechnungs-
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hof, and Japanese SAl, Board of Audit, whose types are independent, are
not uniquely decided on this first factor. Although UK's SAl, National
Audit Office is partly affiliated to Parliament because of the Comptroller
and Auditor General (C&AG) belonging to the House of Commons, it is
substantially independent of both the parliament and the government.
In these countries, the latter factor is critical. The SAl considers the
intensity of needs for the D-effect and the I-effect that both of the parlia-
ment and the government have. As demonstrated before, for a client, its
utility is produced through the use of findings by auditing. So the
intensity of the client k(k=g for Government, k=c for Parliament) for the
two effects, ak for the D-effect, bkfor the I-effect, are calculated as follows.
If the marginal value of each effect denotes MVDk,MVIk, and the
probability of its practical use for decison making, P(D)k, P(I)k, then ak,
bk are calculated as MVDk multiplied by P(D)k for the D-effect and MVIk
multiplied by P(I)k for the I-effect respectively. Here it is worth noting
that agexceeds bgand b, exceeds a, because the government prefers the D
-effect to the I-effect while the parliament's preference is the opposite.
Therefore, if the difference between the intensity ofthe D-effect and the I
-effect for the government is larger than the one for parliament, namely
the former surplus (ag-bg) exceeds the latter surplus(b,-ao), it focuses on
more the D-effect even though being perfectly independent.
The reason is that in this case paying regard to the D-effect for the
SAl increases its utility (see Appendix). Among these countries, Japan
corresponds to the case; one major political party, the Liberal Democratic
Party(LDP), had held power under the parliamentary system for a long
time, so parliamentary power is still lower and its need of the I-effect for
controlling the cabinet government. In contrast, the UK has the two
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party system of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, hence
power change often occurs despite the role of direct control over the gov-
ernment. The repetitive changes by elections, which are fairly strong to
the government, take some burden ofthe political control.
Parliamentary power and its information need for ministerial
responsibility is thus more intensive than the Japanese parliament. The
need intensity of the 1- effect is also strong because of its high marginal
value, high probability of use for the parliament. This leads to the
dominance of the I-effect, according to our model. NAO in fact keeps in
close relation with the Public Accounts Committee(PAC) of the parlia-
ment. However, in Germany the power of parliament and government is
nearly balanced. Besides the SAl in Germany has a mandate to advise4)
the government through the budgeting process. These elements make the
SAl's focus balancing the D-effect for government with the I-effect for
parliament. Now the dominant functions of SAls in the five countries are
indicated as shown in Figure 4, by identifYing the focused client's need 5).
Figure 4. Focused effect by country
Priority Country
D>I France
Japan
D- I Germany
UK
D <I USA
note; D > I, D-I, and D < I denote the dominance of the D-effect, balancing
between the D-effect and the I-effect, and dominance of the I-effect
respectively
-54-
Comparative Studies in Government Auditing 601
7. Conclusions and future research
In this paper, we have considered SAl's activities a subsystem ensur-
ing / controlling the public value whose elements consists of efficiency,
equity, and trust / stability. From this perspective, it has been indicated
that the share burden of the three elements by the SAl is determined by
the intensity and responsibility of other ensuring susbsystems, and its
nationality of political awareness. Especially, as to the equity element,
the SAl in the USA bears a light burden because of the active role of the
Court, whereas the SAl in France bears a heavy burden owing to the
character of the court for government accounting.
Also we have separated the SAl's activities into two efforts, the effort
for the D-effect controlling/recommending to the government agencies
directly, and the effort for the I-effect reporting the findings to the
parliament. Then it has been shown the focused effort by the SAl is
determined upon its institutional position in the government system, the
power balance between parliament and government, and the both clients'
intensity of needs for auditing. The results give the following
characteristics of efforts by the SAl in the five countries:
1) GAO focuses on the I-effect, because it is affiliated to the Congress
prefering the I-effect to the D-effect,
2) French SAl has a responsibility for controlling the government
accounting and public finance, therefore focuses on the D-effect.
On the other hand, as to the SAls in the UK, German and Japan
which are independent types,
3 ) NAO prioritises the I-effect, since controlling the government is partly
made through the power change by the two competing parties and NAO
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keeps the close relationship with the PAC in the Parliament.
4) The SAl in Japan made more effort for the D-effect in the same
parliamentary system as the UK, though its effort is now more focused
in the I-effect. The reason is the ruling party had been stronger in
power than parliament.
5) German's SAl takes the middle position between the UK and Japan in
the distribution to the two efforts. It seems to be caused by the unique
function advising the government in keeping its independence of gov-
ernment and the parliament.
This paper is a preliminary study as to the some strong assumptions
about the clients' preference of the two effects and the behaviour of the
SAL Significant implications may be gained from the work to treat the
marginal value by auditing and the probability of practical use for a client
as endogenous variables ofan SAl's effort, not exogenous ones as assumed
in this paper. Also additional work is needed on the behaviour by the SAl
in the political arena, because its activities may be influenced by the
government and the parliament even though independence of both clients
in the constitution such as in Germany and Japan.
Expressly, further research on the I-effect that the parliament
indirectly controls the government by using audit findings is merited by
the contribution to our understanding of SAl's specific position, which is
placed at the equilibrium ofthe two powers, parliment and government.
Note
1) Schwartz(199l) examined the differences among the SAIs in terms of their systems
of governments.
2) Tirole(1994) views the govern~ent as a distribution of control rights. According to
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him, division of control rights, existence of media and independent judges can be
considered an institution to prevent abuse by government officials.
3) Havens(1990) indicated that congressional requests accounted for up to 80% of all
staff efforts.
4) Section 88 of Federal Budget Code states that on the basis of audit findings, the
Federal Court of Audit may advise the parliament, the government and individual
ministries.
5) This model has focued on the strategic level in the political arena which consists of
the SAl's two main clients, government and parliament. However, when we expand
our scope to the operational/management level, the new public management(NPM)
which is a market-based model of public service, has a significant impact on the SAl's
activities. Since NPM treats government and citizens as providers/suppliers and
customers/consumers respectively, citizens have a direct relation with government by
skipping parliament. An internal market is made up and market mechanism works on
behalf of the parlimentary control over government. Therefore, at the operational/
management level, as the more NPM develops, SAl's role in direct control over govern-
ment and in assisting parliament decreases. In contrast, the traditional role that SAl
verifies the information of the auditee as an independent auditor is revived. This role
produces the I-effect through the another channel and contributes to the citizen's
decision making on the public services as a customer. These influence by NPM may
shift the SAl's effort focus to the another element of the I-effect for the public, as
shown in the case of League Table made by the Local Audit Commission in the UK
Appendix
From the equation (2), we have
Ua = U(fg) + qU(fc) - U(Ca) (A 1)
When the client's value function is separated with the D-effect and the I-effect, each
value function is given by
fg =Dg(e,) + Ig(e,) (A 2)
fc =Dc(e,) + Ic(e2) (A 3)
where e"e2 are the SAl's effort levels for the D-efect and the I-effect respectively.
In order to simplify, assuming that the value function, utility function, and cost function
are linear. We can immediately show the SAl's utility function:
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Ua=(a,el+b,e,)+q(a,el+b,e,)-r(el+e,)
a,=MVDgP(D)g,
b,=MVIgP(l)g,
a,=MVDcP(D)c,
b,=MVIcP(l)c
where r indicates the parameter of the linear cost function.
Since government prefers the D-effect to the I-effect and as to parliament it is opposite,
the parameter a, exceeds the parameter b, and similarly b, exceeds a,. In addition, the
probability p, is generally smaller than the probability p, because the I-effect is
indirectly caused by using the audit findings.
SAls of independent type fundamentally keep independence of each government and
parliament, so the parameter q is considered one. Also if we assume the total effort by
the SAl is constant by the resource constraints and it exterts at least eml for the D-effect,
and em' for the I-effect to maintain the relationship with clients, the following relation
holds:
el+e,=e=const. (A 5)
By substituting the equation (A 5) for (A 4), now we have
Ua=[(a,-b,)-(b,-a,)] el+(b,+b,-r)e (A 6)
Therefore, if (a,-b,) exceeds (b,-a,), that is, government's preference of the D-effect over
the I-effect is more than parliament's inverse one, the more effort for the D-effect el
increases the more the SAl's utility Ua increases. On the contrary, ifthe relation of par-
liament to government about preference for the two effects is reverse, the SAl would
extert more effort for the I-effect because increasing e, promotes Ua.
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Abstract
Government auditing has been moving to the international
harmonisation because of an increase in public accountability and the
activities of the International Organisation ofSupreme Audit Institutions
(INTOSAl). Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in developed countries are,
however, fairly different in functions and influence on the government.
This paper focuses on these differences and shows they have been caused
by each SAl's rational behaviour for its clients.
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